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Anaphora and Logical Form
Abstract
We argue, on general grounds, in favor of
formal meaning representations for natural
language. We then adopt, as a "forcipg function"
for the adequacy of such a representation, the
problem of identifying the possible antecedents of
anaphoric expressions. This suggests certain
structural properties of a representation which
facilitate the identification of possible
antecedents. Given an appropriate representation
language with such properties, it is then possible
to deal with a surprisingly rich class of anaphora.
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I, Introduction
Our objectives in this paper are twofold:
1. to provide a computational approach to certain problems in
anaphora in natural language;
2. to argue in favor of formal meaning representation languages
(MRLs) for natural language.
These two objectives are not independent. It appears that the
solutions to certain problems in anaphora are best formulated
with respect to an appropriately structured logical MRL, so that
the structural entities out of which such an MRL is composed
suggest possible antecedents for anaphor resolution.
More specifically, we have set ourselves the following
problem: what form should a meaning representation assume in
order to facilitate the identification of possible antecedents of
anaphoric expressions, and what computational mechanisms does
this task require? Moreover, we have chosen to investigate this
problem of identifying a set of possible antecedents without
invoking general world knowledge. The separate issue of choosing
the most appropriate antecedent from this set will, in general,
require plausible reasoning based on such general world
knowledge. We are also aware of instances where such knowledge
is required even to propose possible antecedents. Nevertheless,
in this paper, our concern is to explore the implications of a
purely syntactic approach, as well as to ascertain its
limitations. It turns out that a surprisingly rich class of
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anaphora, both pronouns and ellipses, is amenable to such an
approach, provided that an appropriately structured logical MRL
is used. We shall find that the use of such an MRL leads to
particularly simple rules for identifying possible antecedents,
and that the structure of the MRL can be exploited
computationally to preclude certain inappropriate ones. We shall
also find that this task of identifying possible referents is
intimately bound up with an ability to form appropriate
descriptions of them, and that these descriptions are, in turn,
intimately related to logical form.
II. Why Logical Meaning Representations?
Although there is universal agreement within the AI
community that natural language understanding systems must
provide some underlying meaning representation onto which surface
strings are mapped, the nature of this representation remains a
contentious issue. One aspect of this debate has to do with the
form that this representation should take. There appear to be
two points of view: logical forms [e.g., Sandewall, 1971; Woods,
et al, 1972] and structured networks [e.g., Wilks, 1975; Schank,
1975; Simmons, 1973].
The distinction between these alternatives appears to be a
significant one since logical forms are clearly formal languages
within which meanings of surface strings are represented, whereas
the latter are labeled graphs which somehow represent these same
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meanings. This distinction quickly evaporates, however, the
moment one observes that a network is basically a particular
choice of representation (at the implementation level) for some
(conceptual level) logical form. We interpret the work of
Schubert [1976] and Simmons and Bruce [1971] as supporting this
point of view.
Despite this lack of any formal distinction between networks
and logical forms, there is a widespread bias within the AI
community against logical MRLs for natural language. [See for
exampl~e, Charniak and Wilks, 1976]. We suspect that there are
two implicit assumptions underlying this anti-formal point of
view:
1. that the choice of a logical form necessarily implies a
commitment to a corresponding proof theory as one's sole
computation mechanism;
2. that logical forms must have their "natural" representation
at the implementation level, e.g., that
(x)(Ey) . Px,y & Qx,y must be represented by the
S-expression ((X)(E Y)(AND (P X Y)(Q X Y))).
Neither of these assumptions is justified. We have already
observed that networks can be best viewed as implementation level
representations for logical forms, and as we shall show in
Section IV., the computations that we propose for anaphor
resolution within a logical MRL are in no way based on any kind
of proof theory.
If it is the case then that logical forms and networks are
one and the same, why prefer one over the other? We favor
logical form on the following grounds:
- 4 -
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A. Semantics
By virtue of its being a formal language, a logical form
inherits a well defined semantics, namely, its Tarskian
semantics. This is not the case for network representations
presented in vacuo (i.e., without a translation mechanism mapping
the network to a logic). As Woods [1975] points out, networks
often fall short of this requirement.
B. Computation
The high level conceptual representation of meaning provided
by logical forms encourages the formulation of appropriate
processing algorithms at an equally high conceptual level,
independent of how these logical forms are represented at the
implementation level. This provides for perspicuous descriptions
of algorithms, without specifying the irrelevant, CONS cell
level, pointer chasing details required by network
representations. The examples of Section IV illustrate the ease
with which such rules can be formulated, as well as their
conceptual clarity.
C. Representation
There are two issues here: representational perspicuity and
representational adequacy. The first is largely a subjective
matter. We believe logical forms to be more readable and
comprehensible than their corresponding network forms, especially
- 5 -
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when the usual network primitives are considerably augmented in
order to correctly represent logical connectives and quantifiers
and their scopes [Schubert, 1975; Hendrix, 1975].
The second issue - representational adequacy - is far more
important, largely dealing with the ability of a given meaning
representation language to express the meaning of surface
strings. A closely related issue is that of representational
closure. Can one tell, from the given specification of an MRL,
what can and what cannot be expressed within it? Because any
logical MRL has both a well defined syntax and a well defined
semantics, it necessarily exhibits a high degree of closure.
This is not the case for network representations presented in
vacuo, precisely because they have no semantics. Many of the
network based meaning representations in current natural language
systems [Schank, 1975; Wilks, 1975; Norman and Rumelhart, 1975]
suffer from this defect, a fact that makes it extremely difficult
to assess their content.
It is instructive in connection with the above discussion to
note that these very same issues were hotly debated within the
data base management community during the early 1970's. There
too, the basic choice was between a network view of data
[CODASYL, 1971] and a logical, or so-called relational, view
[Codd, 1970]. Moreover, the arguments advanced in favor of the
relational view were in many ways isomorphic to those we have
made favoring logical form for meaning representations. At least
- 6 -
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within the data base community, the logical view currently
prevails, primarily because its high conceptual level provides
so-called "data independence," i.e., one's view of the data is
independent of implementation details.
III. On Appropriate Logical MRLs
In the previous section, we argued on fairly general grounds
in favor of formal meaning representation languages for natural
language. Of course, not just any logical MRL will do. At the
very least, any such formal language must provide for
quantification and the usual logical connectives, but even under
these requirements there remains a broad spectrum of possible
logical representations. There are at least two dimensions to
this spectrum corresponding to representational level and
representational structure. With respect to level,
representations in current systems range from very "surfacy"
[Simmons, 1970] to very "deep", primitive-based ones [Wilks,
1975; Schank, 1975]. Wilks, in Computational Semantics [Charniak
and Wilks, 1976: 176] provides a good discussion of these issues.
In this paper, we use as illustration an MRL that keeps very
close to the surface syntax and lexicon. We do so because the
computational task that we have taken as a "forcing function" for
an adequate representation, namely, identifying possible
antecedents for anaphor resolution, seems not to require a deep
level and is moreover facilitated by a "surfacy" one, at least
for a broad and interesting class of phenomena.
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Our focus in discussing logical MRLs is on their
representational structure. We have found that the need to
provide appropriate antecedents for anaphor resolution suggests
certain structural constraints on possible MRLs which greatly
facilitate this process. In this connection, we emphasize that
we are not here proposing a fully developed logical MRL. To do
so would require, at the very least, adequate representations for
tense, modality, mass terms, events, etc. - issues which we have
so far completely ignored. The MRL used in this paper is merely
a vehicle for displaying certain formal structural properties
which we have found necessary for the identification of
antecedents. Our belief is that any fully articulated logical
MRL will have to provide these structural units if it is to deal
effectively with anaphora. Accordingly, one way of viewing our
proposal is as a set of design constraints on the structure of
possible logical MRLs for natural language. The remainder of
this section deals with these structural properties.
A. Lambda-expressions
For a formal MRL to be adequate for the resolution of verb
phrase ellipsis, it must provide for constructions equivalent to
lambda-expressions. For example, the sentence pair
la. John loves Mary.
2. So does Bill.
- 8 -
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requires, as the antecedent of the ellipsed verb phrase, the
formal construct >(x) [Love x, Mary] corresponding to "loving
Mary", whence the resolved sentence lb. becomes
Bill, \(x) [Love x, Mary]
which simplifies to
Love Bill, Mary
(Note that our preferred notation for applying a
lambda-expression to an argument is to follow the argument by the
lambda expression, corresponding to normal subject-predicate word
order in English.)
B. Separation of Descriptional and Assertional Information:
Types
Since the antecedents of many anaphoric expressions are
descriptions, an adequate formalism must be so organized that
these descriptions stand out clearly. For example, consider the
pair of sentences
2a. Some cotton T-shirts are expensive.
b. but not the one that Mary gave to John yesterday.
In a "flat" predicate calculus MRL (ignoring the distindtion
between "some" plural and "some" singular), sentence 2a. might be
represented by
(Ex). Cotton x & T-shirt x & Expensive x
- 9 -
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Now intuitively, the antecedent of "one" in sentence 2b. is
something like "cotton T-shirt", but from the flat predicate
calculus representation, there is no more reason to suppose that
Cotton and T-shirt form a possible antecedent than Cotton and
Expensive, or T-shirt and Expensive, or any one or all three.
That is, there is no structural indication that Cotton T-shirt is
a referenceable unit. We believe such an indication is necessary
in any formalism adequate for anaphor resolution.
Using the structure of a typed logic, predicates that
constrain the range of a quantified variable - i.e., types -
(like T-shirt here) can be structurally distinguished from
predicates that assert things (as "Expensive" does here).
Moreover, using the lambda operator, the notion of type can be
extended from simple one-place predicates to more complex ones to
yield all and only the allowable referenceable entities.
For example, we can represent
"T-shirt" as T-shirt
"cotton T-shirt" as >i(u:T-shirt) [Cotton u]
"T-shirt that Mary gave Fred" as ><(u:T-shirt) [Gave Mary,Fred,u]
(The first is merely a shorthand for X(u:T-shirt) [True] .) Notice
that we are postulating a representation for "cotton T-shirt"
that is more highly structured than a simple conjunction of
Cotton and T-shirt (T-shirt x & Cotton x). Specifically, we are
separating that part of the noun phrase denoting the primary
- 10 -
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class to which an entity belongs (usually the head noun) from
those parts denoting restrictions on that class (conveyed by
adjectives and relative clauses).
This provides yet another structural property that a logical
MRL should possess in order to facilitate the identification of
antecedents for anaphor resolution. Consider
3. Mary bought a tie-dyed cotton T-shirt and Fred bought an
embroidered one.
Whether intuitively "one" refers to "cotton T-shirt" or "tie-dyed
cotton T-shirt" or merely "T-shirt", it must refer at least to
"T-shirt", the primary class denoted by the noun phrase. There
is no way (pronominally) in English to refer to a restriction
without also referring to the primary class. This is our main
reason for keeping them distinct in our logical MRL.
Another consequence of this separation of descriptional from
assertional information is that it avoids problems that Woods
[1975] discusses with respect to adequate representations for
relative clauses. First, sentences like "A dog that had rabies
bit a man" and "A dog that bit a man had rabies" can be assigned
distinct representations, for example
(Ex:X(u:Dog) [Have u, Rabies]) (Ey:Man) . Bit x, y
(Ex:X(u:Dog)[(Ey:Man). Bit u, y]) . Have x, Rabies
More importantly, processing rules such as those proposed in
Section IV, can treat these two representations differently. As
- 11 -
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Woods point out, conventional semantic networks fail to represent
the distinction between these two sentences. From the
perspective of the above discussion, one reason for this is
clear: a conventional network is a representation, at the
implementation level, of a "flat" predicate logic.
IV. Examples
In this section, we present several fragments of discourse,
each containing anaphoric expressions - pronouns and/or ellipses.
Recall that we are not concerned here with the kinds of external
knowledge needed to choose among possible antecedents for an
anaphoric expression. What we are concerned with is insuring
that
1. in cases where the antecedent of an anaphoric expression is
not explicitly present, it can often be derived through
purely syntactic manipulations of an appropriately
structured MRL;
2. the properties we have proposed for a logical MRL make such
manipulations simple to express and apply.
Since developing our approach to anaphora and logical-form,
we have discovered that it is compatible with much that is
current in transformational linguistics today. (For a survey of
current ideas on anaphora in linguistics and psychology, see
[Nash-Webber, 1977].) With respect to a level of "logical form",
Chomsky [1975] has argued for such a level within a two-stage
system of "semantic interpretation". In this system, surface
structures are first converted to logical forms by semantic
- 12 -
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interpretation rules involving scope, bound anaphora, thematic
relations, etc. [Chomsky, 1975: 105]. These logical forms are
then subject to further interpretation by other semantic rules
involving discourse properties, situation, communicative
intention, etc. [Chomsky, 1975: 104] to give fuller
representations of meaning. Moreover, a primary reason for
postulating such a level seems to be Chomsky's feeling that the
"general principles of anaphora apply to logical forms rather
than to surface structures directly" [Chomsky, 1975: 241 ft. 31].
The notion that verb phrase deletion makes reference to a
logical ,representation of the sentence in order to identify
"identical" predicates, later instances of which may be deleted,
has been advanced independently by several linguists, including
[Sag, 1976; Williams, 1977]. Moreover, the logical form adopted
by these two has a form similar to Church's lambda calculus.
Even the notion that pronominal antecedents may not be present
linguistically, but may have to be derived can be found in the
current linguistics literature as well [Bresnan, 1971].
With our examples, we give a small set of manipulation rules
which yield the needed antecedents. We make no claims for the
completeness of these rules; there obviously remains a great deal
of work to be done along these lines (see Section VI). We do
believe, however, that the examples indicate the utility of our
basic approach, and that this approach provides a promising
direction for further research.
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A. Implicit Sets
Our first example illustrates one way of deriving a set as a
candidate antecedent for "they". Consider the sentences
4a. Mary gave each boy a T-shirt.
b. She bought them at Macy s.
The first may be represented as
4c. (Vx:Boy) (Ey:T-shirt) . Gave Mary, x, y
(For simplicity, we will ignore the fact that "each boy" is
probably anaphoric, referring to each boy in some previously
mentioned set or one implicitly defined by context, and treat it
rather as a universally quantified noun phrase.)
Notice that we are considering each sentence individually,
since we want to assign it a representation that is correct, but
which does not depend on what may follow. The result will often
be a reading that is in some sense noncommittal: it will be vague
but true. If subsequently we learn more about the situation, we
will refine this representation to reflect our new knowledge
state, as should become clear through the following examples.
The second sentence we represent initially with its
anaphoric elements overtly marked, that is,
4d. Bought SHE1 , THEY1 , Macy's
(We subscript the pronoun symbols merely to keep several
instances of the same one distinct, as would be the case in "They
- 14 -
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thanked her for them".) Next, we identify possible referents for
the anaphoric terms. Since Mary is the only female around, we
trivially assign her as the referent of SHE,
Regarding candidate antecedents for THEY1 , we postulate two
ways of deriving possible sets from sentences like 4a.
1. Form the set description of any type restricting a
universally quantified variable. (We represent the set
description of type C by {xICx}.)
2. Let W be a (prior) formula not containing the anaphoric
element THEY nor any negation in the main clause. (In the
current example, 4c. plays the role of W.) Suppose W has an
existentially quantified variable y that lies within the
scope of a universally quantified variable. Form the set
description of the set of y's satisfying W. This is a
straightforward procedure, involving the type of y
restricted by an expression deriving from W. Details are
given in [Nash-Webber, forthcoming], but the example should
suggest its basic outline.
Thus, sentence 4a. yields {xtBoy x}, the set of boys, via the
first procedure, and {vjT-shirt v & (Ew:Boy) . Gave Mary,w,v} via
the second one, i.e. the set of T-shirts, for each of which
there is some boy to whom Mary gave it. Substituting each of
these sets in turn for THEY1 , yields
4e. Bought Mary, {xlBoy x}, Macy's
f. Bought Mary, {vIT-shirt v & (Ew:Boy) . Gave Mary,w,v}, Macy's
That is, either Mary bought all the boys at Macy's or she bought
there all the T-shirts she gave out.(l) Real world knowledge
would now be needed to choose the more plausible reading.
Representations 4e&f. are somewhat simplified with respect to
- 15 -
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Notice that in English the pronoun "they", as well as many
plural noun phrases, are ambiguous between a collective reading
("all together") and a distributive one ("taken one at a time").
Sometimes, a lexical item will indicate that a plural should be
understood distributively, as "each" does in "Mary's suitcases
were each weighed at the airport". Sometimes, semantic
selectional restrictions can be used to choose between the two.
For example, "pile" requires a collective interpretation of its
object: "She piled them into a heap" doesn't mean "for each one,
she piled it into a heap". But often, only unknown aspects of
the situation can furnish the appropriate information. For
example, if we learn that "Mary's suitcases were weighed at the
airport", we cannot say for certain whether each one was weighed
there separately or just the whole lot together.
In line then with the policy described above of always
opting for a vague but true interpretation, rather than making
unsubstantiated choices, we will interpret plurals
non-distributively, unless or until additional information would
lead us to an alternate decision.
theT nbcayon o resoIve3 ainapEora (.e. by-y simple
substitution of their antecedents), since it is important to
distinguish whether the original representation contained an
anaphor or a full term (see Example C.2 below).
- 16 -
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B. Type Antecedents
Our next example illustrates the identification of
descriptions as candidate antecedents for anaphoric "one".
5a. Mary gave each boy a green T-shirt.
b. She gave Sue a red one.
vWe interpret sentence 5a. like 4a. above, except for the
additional modifier "green" on T-shirt.
(Vx:Boy) (Ey: X(u:T-shirt) [Green u]) . Gave Mary, x, y
Sentence 5b. can be represented initially as
(Ez: )(u:P?) [Red u]) . Gave SHE 1 , Sue, z
That is, there is something of unknown type P? that should be
derivable from context, which we know explicitly is red, which
some known female SHE 1 gave Sue. Our task is now to identify
possible antecedents for SHE 1 and P?.
Transformational grammarians, including [Langacker, 1966;
Reinhart, 1976], present us with a simple syntactic criterion for
rejecting Sue as an antecedent for SHE1: "she" precedes "Sue" in
the surface sentence and the node in the parse tree for this
sentence off which "She" hangs neither "commands" (Langacker's
term) nor "C-commands" (Reinhart's term) the node for "she". So
again by default, there being no other females around, we assign
Mary as the referent for SHE1 .
- 17 -
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As for P?, its possible antecedents include all "recently"
mentioned types, independent of the particular quantifiers,
("Recent" seems to mean here the current sentence, the previous
one, and perhaps the one before that. It does not seem to be
affected by task structure [Deutsch, 1975] or story structure, or
any of the other factors that seem to change the set of available
antecedents for definite pronouns, "he", "it", etc.)
The types explicitly given in example 5 are: Boy, T-shirt
and \(u:T-shirt)[Green u], Notice that when one type is
constructed out of other types via the lambda operator, we
include them all as possible candidate antecedents. Prescribing
exactly what criteria one would use to identify the most
plausible antecedent for P?, or in what way one would apply them,
is not within the scope of this paper. But they would include
the semantic criterion that one be able to predicate Red of an
entity of type P?, This would eliminate Ž(u:T-shirt)[Green y]
through application of a "clashing color" axiom: if something is
green, it is not red. (Notice that if sentence 5b. had been
5b'. Fred, she gave an extra-large one.
there would be no reason to eliminate this description as a
plausible antecedent.) Under rhetorical criteria, we would
expect parallelism to argue for plausibility. That is, if two
successive sentences are structurally similar ("parallel") and in
the latter, anaphoric "one" helps to fill role R (here, the
object), then it has a very plausible antecedent in the noun
- 18 -
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phrase filling role R in the previous sentence (here, the
previous object "a green T-shirt"). But our point here is not to
specify procedures for choosing among candidate antecedents; it
is rather to show how a suitable logical framework provides in a
straightforward way all and only the appropriate possibilities.
C. Predicate Antecedents
1. Simple Verb Phrase Deletion
The next few examples illustrate some problems involving
verb phrase ellipsis, which are handled rather neatly within our
framework.
6a. Mary gave Sue a T-shirt.
b. Jane did too.u
The representation that we assign to sentence 6a. is
(Ex:T-shirt) . Gave Mary, Sue, x
Sentence 6b., we interpret as predicating something (P?) of Jane
that had previously been predicated of someone else:
P? Jane
To identify possible antecedents for P?, we find the
one-place predicates that either are given explicitly or can be
derived via lambda abstraction on the subject position. (Again,
one probably need only search for such predicates in the current
sentence if it has several clauses or in the one or two sentences
- 19 -
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immediately preceding it, as the half-life of predicate
antecedents, like that of type antecedents, seems to be very
short. Note that we are viewing the first argument place of a
predicate as corresponding to surface subject position. Though
this requires a different representation for active and passive
sentences, we see the need for this on other grounds, for
example, their difference with respect to simple verb phrase
deletion:
John hit a linguist
Fred did too.
as opposed to
John was hit by a linguist.
Fred was too.
*Fred did too.)
This example is simple in that there is only one such
one-place predicate abstractable off a subject:
X(r)[(Ex:T-shirt) . Gave r, Sue, x]
that is, giving Sue a T-shirt. Substituting for P? yields
Jane, X(r)[(Ex:T-shirt) . Gave r, Sue, x]
which is equivalent to
(Ex:T-shirt) . Gave Jane, Sue x
Note that this representation does not commit us to both girls
having given Sue the same T-shirt, nor need they be different.
The description of the first one is
- 20 -
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nz: T-shirt z & Gave Mary, Sue, z
"a T-shirt that Mary gave Sue", where indicates the indefinite
operator. (z might be called in English "the T-shirt which Mary
gave Sue" if no other T-shirt in the discourse meets this
description.) The second T-shirt is describable as
flw: T-shirt w & Gave Jane, Sue w
"a T-shirt that Jane gave Sue".
It is important to be able to derive such descriptions,
since the entities they describe may serve as antecedents for
later anaphoric expressions, for example,
6c. Neither of them fit her.
where "them" refers to the implicit set of T-shirts given to Sue,
who is also the most plausible antecedent of "her".
2. "Sloppy Identity"
Our next example illustrates a phenomenon that has been
called the "sloppy identity problem" [Ross, 1967]. It involves
accounting for the appearance of an additional reading for
sentences containing deleted verb phrases. That is, while
sentence 7a. seems unambiguous, sentence 7b. might mean either
that Fred beats Garth's wife or that he beats his own. How do we
account for this?
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7a. Garth beats his wife.
b. Fred does too.
vWe assign 7a. an initial representation in which its
anapnoric term is overtly marked.
7c. Beat Garth, 's(Wife) EIL
(where 's is defined to be a function that takes a unary
predicate like wife, School, etc., and returns a function like
"wite-of", "school-of", etc. 4s(Wife), for example, is a
function that takes a man as its argument and returns his wife:
"s(,Ivife) John is John's wife. Having a function like 's
elimrinates the need to postulate a separate "Y-of" function for
every unary predicate Y.)
vith no other male around, we can assign HE 1 to Garth by
default, that is,
7d. Beat Garth, 's(Vife) Garth
vwe assign sentence 7b. the representation
7e. P? Fred
Now, while there are no explicit one-place predicates around to
serve as an antecedent for P?, there are two ways in which to
abstract one from 7d.
(i) )(r) [Beat r, 's(Wife) Garth]
(ii) \(r) [Beat r, 's(Wife) r]
- 22 -
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The first represents beating Garth's wife and the second, beating
one's own. Substituting for P?, we get the two plausible
readings
Fred, \(r) [Beat r, 's(Wife) Garth]
Fred, >.(r) [Beat r, 's(Wife) r]
That is, either Fred beats Garth's wife or he beats his own.
(We noted earlier the need to distinguish whether an
argument place was originally filled by an anaphoric expression
or by a full noun phrase. Observe that if sentence 7a. had read
"Garth beats Garth's wife", which would be represented simply as
7d., the following sentence, "Fred does too", could only mean
that Fred beats Garth's wife. While we have simplified things
for this presentation, in an actual implementation, we would have
to indicate "he = Garth", rather than simply replacing "he" with
"Garth", in order to derive all and only the correct lambda
abstractions.)
3. Abstracting Predicates from Non-Subject Position
The point of the next example is to illustrate abstracting
one-place predicates from positions other than the surface
subject. In English, "likewise", "too", "similarly", etc.,
followed optionally by a preposition and then by a noun phrase
indicate that the role filled by the new noun phrase in a
previously mentioned predicate is a non-subject one. (As
illustrated earlier, a noun phrase followed by an auxiliary
- 23 -
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requires that the noun phrase fills the subject role of a
previous predicate.)
8a. John hit a cop.
b. Likewise, a CIA agent.
The first sentence may be represented as
8c. (Ex:Cop) . Hit John, x
and the second one as
8d. (Ey:CIA-agent) . ? y
where (? stands for an anaphoric predicate like P?, but one whose
argument fills a non-subject role.
To resolve 0?, we must identify the one-place predicates
that can be abstracted from non-subject positions. From 8c., we
get
>(r)[Hit John, r]
which, substituted for G? in 8d., yields
(Ey:CIA-agent) . y, (r) Hit John, r
that is, "Likewise, John hit a CIA agent."
It might appear that one could resolve "likewise"-ellipses
at the level of the surface string alone, but this is not the
case. Consider the following example:
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9a. John gave Sally her present.
b. Likewise, Fred.
Obviously, while substituting "Fred" for "Sally" in the surface
string would yield an interpretable sentence, "John gave Fred her
present", this is not the only, nor the most plausible reading of
the ellipsis in 9b.
We represent 9a. as
9c. Gave John, Sally, 's(Present) SHE 1
which we interpret as
9d. Gave John, Sally, 's(Present) Sally
she being the only female around. Sentence 9b., we represent as
9e. ? Fred
To resolve Q?, we identify the one-place predicates that may be
abstracted from non-subject positions. From 9d., we get
i.X(r)[Gave John, r, 's(Present) Sally]
ii. k(r) [Gave John, r, 's(Present) r]
iii. X(r) [Gave John, Sally, r]
substituting for e? and flattening for clarity, we get
Gave John, Fred, 's(Present) Sally
"Likewise, John gave Fred Sally's present."
Gave John, Fred, 's(Present) Fred
"Likewise, John gave Fred Fred's present."
Gave John, Sally, Fred
"Likewise, John gave Sally Fred."
Again, the preferred interpretation would be chosen by using
world knowledge.
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4. Abstracting Conjoined Predicates
Our final example of predicate anaphora illustrates another
necessary way of deriving a candidate antecedent: by first
conjoining predicates applied to the same argument and then
abstracting a new predicate off the common argument. That is,
given
P x1, .. ,y, ...
followed by (or explicitly conjoined to)
Q z 1, ... ,y,
we can derive
y, (r)[P x , ... , r, ... & Q z , ... , r, ... ]
To illustrate the need for such a rule, consider the example
10a. I walk and I chew gum.
b. Ford does too, but not at the same time.
These we represent as
Walk I & Chew-gum I
P? Ford
(Since we have not introduced a representation for tense, we
cannot represent "but not at the same time". We shall use it
informally, rather, to constrain possible antecedents for P?.
That is, P? must sensibly refer to two or more actions which are
not done by Ford simultaneously.)
To resolve P?, we must identify the previous one-place
predicates. Walk and Chew-gum are given explicitly, but
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substituting either one for P? leads to an unsatisfactory result,
neither being compatible with "but not at the same time" (e.g.,
"Ford can chew gum, but not at the same time."). However, the
above rule yields another one-place predicate, namely
N(r) [Walk r & Chew-gum r]
which is a plausible antecedent for P?.
D. "Donkeys"
As our final example of how an appropriate logical
representation of a sentence can yield antecedents necessary for
anaphor resolution, we will consider a particularly bothersome
class of sentences, illustrated by example 11.
11. Every man who owns a donkey beats it.
The problem lies in identifying the antecedent of "it". It is
not "a donkey". The sentence does not mean that every man who
owns a donkey beats a donkey, but rather that he beats any donkey
that he owns. Moreover, there is no way of construing the
existential quantifier associated with "a donkey" such that "it"
falls within its scope. How does the correct antecedent for "it"
emerge from our framework?
We first assign sentence 11 the interpretation
(i) ('x: (u:Man)[(Ey:Donkey) . Own u, y]) . Beat x, IT
- 27 -
Anaphora and Logical Form
That is, for every man for whom there is some donkey that he
owns, he beats it. Now while there is nothing explicit to serve
as the antecedent for "it", it turns out that "it" can also
reference a certain kind of functional entity which arises from
existentials.
We postulate the following rule for identifying a possible
antecedent for IT.
1. Find a type restriction which contains an existentially
quantified variable y not within the scope of either a
universal quantifier or negation.
2. Determine the description of y with respect to this type
restriction: any entity which satisfies this description is
a possible antecedent for IT. (Again, we omit the
specification of the rule for determining y's description,
although one should be clear from the example.)
For (i), there is one such type restriction - [(Ey:Donkey) . Own
u,y]. The description of the existentially quantified y is
(ii) >%(u) [y: Donkey y & Own u,y]
That is, it is a function which, given a u, returns a donkey that
u owns if u owns a donkey. For a given x then, ry: Donkey y &
Own x,y is a donkey that x owns. Substituting into (i) yields
(iii) (ýx:\(u:Man)[(Ey:Donkey) Own u,y])
. Beat x, y: Donkey y & Own x,y
Notice that this rule is independent of how the type
containing the existential has been quantified. Thus, in
12. Some man who owns a donkey beats it.
13. Which man who owns a donkey beats it?
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the antecedent of "it" is the donkey obtained by applying
function (ii) to the quantified variable associated with "man".
V. Discussion
The examples of Section IV were designed to illustrate the
feasibility of deriving possible antecedents for anaphoric
expressions directly from an appropriately structured logical
representation. Notice that basic to this representation is an
adequate indication of the scope of logical operators
quantifiers, conjunction and negation - for otherwise, we could
not deal correctly with antecedents arising from existentials
(e.g., the examples in Sections IV.A and IV.D). Also basic is
the recognition and correct attachment of modifiers - relative
clauses, prepositional phrases, prenominal modifiers, etc. -
necessary for correctly handling "one" anaphora (e.g., Section
IV.B). Taken together, these impose the requirement of a
pre-processor for mapping surface strings onto logical forms at
least as powerful as that of the LUNAR system [Woods et al,
1972]. It follows that much of the burden of antecedent
identification is actually being placed upon this pre-processor,
given the need for an appropriate logical form before our
approach can be applied.
It should also be clear that what we are describing in this
paper is essentially a competence model for anaphor resolution.
In its crudest implementation, one would first generate a set of
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possible antecedents, and then test each of these by plausible
reasoning using general world knowledge. Of course, we are not
seriously proposing such a generate and test implementation.
There are a variety of heuristics that can be invoked to aid the
choice of a most probable antecedent, and any performance model
must make use of such knowledge. (Heuristics for assigning
antecedents have been proposed throughout the linguistics,
psychology and AI literatures. See [Nash-Webber, 1977] for a
discussion of many of them.) Nevertheless, even a performance
model must have the ability to determine the space of possible
alternatives from which such heuristics are to make their choice.
Since some of these alternatives may not be present explicitly,
it is here that the approach of this paper becomes relevant.
VI. Further Problems
As this paper is necessarily brief, we do not have the space
to discuss at length such interesting issues as the effects of
negation or various opaque contexts on the kinds of antecedents
evoked. These are discussed in [Nash-Webber, forthcoming]. We
will, however, mention one such issue -- the problem of
existential noun phrases in negative contexts.
The scope of negation is inherently ambiguous, and as with
quantifiers, different scope interpretations yield different
antecedents. Moreover, some interpretations may yield no
antecedent at all. For example, we know that in a positive
- 30 -
Anaphora and Logical Form
context, an existential noun phrase will always result in an
entity which can be described in terms of that cohtext. So, if
John married a Swedish girl, "she" can refer to the Swedish girl
that John married. However, in a negative context, "she" may
refer to other entities depending on how the scope of negation is
interpreted.
Negated Verb
14a. John didn't marry a Swedish girl.
b. He lived with her for three years.
("she" = the Swedish girl John was involved with)
Negated Modifier
15a. John didn't marry a Swedish girl.
b. She was from Denmark.
("she" = the girl John married)
Negated Main Descriptor
16a. John didn't marry a Swedish girl.
b. She was at least 15 years his senior.
("she" = the Swedish female that John married)
Negated Proposition
17a. John didn't catch a trout.
b. *He ate it for dinner.
Again, we would want to postulate a neutral initial
representation for negation, one that might be vague, but would
nevertheless be true. Only when we were required to - e.g., in
order to resolve an anaphoric expression - would we then attempt
to make a commitment to the scope of negation. (Note that a
belief context poses much the same problem as negation, i.e. that
of determining the scope of belief. For example, in
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18a. John thought he married a Swedish girl,
b. but she was really from Denmark.
as in Example 15 above, "she" is the girl that John married.
Here again, it is only the modifier "Swedish" that should be
taken as falling within the scope of belief.)
As we mentioned earlier, before one can fix on a particular
representation language, one must provide for mass concepts; for
tense; for quantifiers other than universals and existentials;
for facts, events, states or acts; and for generics, among other
things, as the following examples illustrate.
19a. When John spilled beer on the sofa,
b. his dog licked it up.
-("it" = the specific quantity of beer John spilled on
the sofa)
20. John drinks beer because it tastes good.
-("it" = beer)
21a. Many linguists smoke,
b. although they know it causes cancer.
-("they" = the lTnguists who smoke;
"it" = smoking)
22a. Few linguists smoke,
b. since they know it causes cancer.
-("they' -' T inguists,)
23a. A beagle smiled at me yesterday.
b. They are very friendly dogs.
-("they" = the generic class of beagles)
24a. John dunked Mary's braids in the inkwell.
b. Because it- made her cry, he apologized for doing it 2 .
-("it I " = the evhnt of John's dunking Mary's braids 2
in the inkwell;
"it " = the act of dunking Mary's braids in the inkwell)
Finally, although we have indicated the need for plausible
inference for choosing an appropriate candidate from a set of
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possible antecedents (e.g., Section IV.B.), it is also the case
that such inferencing may be needed to derive possible
antecedents. That is, not all possible antecedents are
structurally derivable.
25a. Yesterday I saw a couple in the park.
b. He was wearing shorts and she had on a dashiki.
Clearly, what is required is some sort of general knowledge of
the form: "A couple usually consists of two individuals, one
male and one female."
Although we can see no a priori reasons why a formal
approach could not accommodate the use of plausible reasoning in
the derivation of possible antecedents, we have chosen not to
explore these issues in this paper. Rather, our intention in
this work is to first determine just how far an essentially
syntactic approach can be pushed.
In this connection, notice that our treatment of all of the
examples of Section IV has a decidedly syntactic character:
descriptions of those entities proposed as possible antecedents
are either explicitly present in some formula of the MRL, or can
be derived from such a formula by appropriate local operations on
its structure, independent of the availability of general world
knowledge. The determination of possible antecedents based on
such purely syntactic considerations and the formulation of
design constraints on MRLs to facilitate this process best
describe the objectives of this paper.
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